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Abstract 
A growing body of research indicates that the way health care professionals conceptualize mental health might have 
important clinical implications. We adopted a discursive psychology approach to explore clinical psychologists’ accounts 
of mental health and its effects. Semistructured interviews were conducted with 11 clinical psychologists in the East 
Midlands region of the United Kingdom. The participants constructed mental health through building up biological factors 
and psychosocial aspects as opposite ends of the same spectrum, and then positioned themselves as distant from 
these extremes to manage issues of stake and accountability. A discourse of moral concern for service users was used 
to negotiate the implications of having different views of mental health from service users, enabling clinicians to manage 
issues of accountability and demonstrate their ability to be helpful. This suggests that clinicians should be mindful of the 
effects of their use of language and make the contingent nature of their knowledge explicit. 
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In this study we adopted a discursive psychological 
approach to explore clinical psychologists’ constructions 
of mental health and its perceived influence on their work 
with service users. This approach is concerned with how 
language is used within social interactions to manage and 
create reality, and as such represents a move away from 
the traditional cognitive psychology view of language as a 
tool to discover mental states. 
Since its inception more than half a century ago, the 
notion of mental health has been used to designate a range 
of concepts, including a psychological state, a dimension of 
health, and wider disciplines such as psychology and 
psychiatry. Given the variety of purposes for which the 
term has been adopted, it is not surprising that a great deal 
of controversy surrounds the meaning of mental health, 
with views reflecting the interests and values of the groups 
attempting to define the term. Indeed, a widely accepted 
definition of mental health remains absent from the 
literature, and the concept is frequently dismissed as “too 
nebulous” to warrant serious exploration (Newton, 1988; 
Secker, 1998). Notably, the APA Dictionary of Psychology 
(VandenBos, 2007) does not have an entry on mental 
health, whereas Campbell’s Psychiatric Dictionary 
(Campbell, 2010) defines it as a synonym of mental 
hygiene and a state of psychological well-being. The  
failure to provide a clear definition of mental health could 
be seen to imply that the concept has a self-evident valid-
ity. Moreover, it suggests a peculiar state of affairs, 
because psychological literature rarely includes discus-
sions about the general nature of mental health, but at the 
same time asserts knowledge about the concept. 
One consequence of the ambiguity about what consti-
tutes mental health is a number of controversies regard-
ing its ontological and epistemological status. A central 
point of contention is whether the concept of mental 
health is ever value-free and whether mental health and 
mental illness should be conceptualized as representing 
extreme ends of the same continuum (Kendell, 1995). 
Other researchers have suggested mental health to be 
qualitatively different from mental illness, implying that 
a person can be both mentally healthy and mentally ill at 
the same time (Secker, 1998). Indeed, these concepts 
have often been used interchangeably in psychological 
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literature (Malek, 2004; Pickering, 2006), the boundaries 
between health and illness are drawn differently in different 
cultural contexts (Fernando, 2003), and the term mental 
health has frequently been employed to denote the 
management of mental illness (Vassilev & Pilgrim, 2007). 
Despite its elusive nature, there is a growing body of 
research indicating that the ways in which clinicians con-
ceptualize mental health guide and inform their attitudes, 
reasoning, and approaches to assessment, formulation, 
intervention, and evaluation (Harland et al., 2009). 
Researchers have therefore suggested that clinical psy-
chologists’ conceptualizations of mental health have sig-
nificant clinical implications for their work with service 
users (Hugo, 2001; Stevens & Harper, 2007). 
Clinicians’ Conceptualizations of 
Mental Health and its Effects 
Research examining clinicians’ conceptualizations of 
mental health and its implications comprise two main 
parts. The first is concerned with how conceptualizations 
influence attitudes and behaviors in relation to service 
users. Such empirical studies have focused on the conse-
quences of endorsing biological and psychosocial con-
ceptualizations that have been found to influence 
clinicians’ attitudes (Bennett, Thirlaway & Murray, 
2008), treatment decisions (Cape, Antebi, Standen, & 
Glazebrook, 1994), engagement with service users (Kent 
& Read, 1998), and the quality of treatment provided 
(Wallach, 2004). 
The second part includes studies concerned with the 
status of clinicians’ ontological beliefs about mental 
health and the effects of these on their work with service 
users. Such studies have found that psychiatrists and clin-
ical psychologists are unwilling to accept mental disor-
ders as real and natural categories (Ahn, Flanagan, Marsh, 
& Sanislow, 2006), that ontological views about mental 
health influence clinicians’ beliefs about the effectiveness 
of interventions and choice of treatment options, and that 
service users’ views about the etiology of their condition 
are shaped by their clinicians (Ahn, Proctor, & Flanagan, 
2009). All of these studies provide support for the notion 
that clinicians’ conceptualizations of mental health have 
important clinical implications. 
The Problematization of Mental 
Health 
Although previous studies have been usefully conducted, 
they appear conceptually and methodologically limited 
because they rest on the a priori assumption that mental 
health is a consensual object of thought about which only 
attributions might vary. Past studies have assumed that 
conceptualizations, beliefs, and attitudes reside internally 
within individuals, that these remain relatively stable 
across contexts, and that they can be elicited through 
appropriate research methods. The notion that people’s 
language reflects their underlying thoughts and feelings 
has been disputed by discursive psychologists such as 
Potter and Wetherell (1987), who have argued that people 
construct accounts to serve different functions. In support 
of this, there is extensive research on health (Crossley, 
2002) and beyond (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) suggesting 
that people are often inconsistent in their discussions of 
ideological dilemmas and that attitudes change even dur-
ing the same interactions (Billig, 1999). This poses diffi-
culties for quantitative methodologies, argued to be 
insensitive to the performative, variable, and contextual 
aspects of people’s accounts (Parker, 2012). 
As such, we propose that clinical psychologists’ 
accounts of mental health and their effects can be produc-
tively explored by focusing on the ways in which these are 
discursively constructed through employing a social 
constructionist epistemology. Social constructionism holds 
a relativist position with regard to truth and thus views 
scientific inquiry not as an objective pursuit of truth but as 
a social institution which actively and systematically 
produces specific versions of reality and truth (Nightingale 
& Cromby, 1999). Taking this perspective, an 
examination of the various ways in which mental health is 
constructed, negotiated, and authenticated, and the 
implications of such accounts, is made possible. 
Methodology: Discursive Psychology 
In this study we adopted the theory and methods of Potter 
and Wetherell’s (1987) discursive psychology, in which it 
is assumed that language is constitutive and that people’s 
accounts are constructed to perform specific functions. 
The variability and inconsistency of people’s accounts are 
considered to be the result of language being oriented 
toward different functions. For instance, researchers have 
described how accounts are constructed as factual in jour-
nal articles by minimizing the agency of the scientist, 
thereby implicitly locating agency in the objects of 
research (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). It has been noted that 
speakers tend to draw on a range of rhetorical strategies 
when they have a stake in the outcome and in discussing 
contested issues, such as mental health (Harper, 1995). 
Through analyzing the various discursive strategies that 
speakers use to construct their accounts, the functions or 
interests served by these can thus be made more visible. 
We propose that the application of a discursive psy-
chological approach to the examination of clinical psy-
chologists’ constructions of mental health and its 
influence on their work with service users enables an 
analysis of the processes through which mental health is 
“talked into being.” Through paying attention to the orga-
nization and functions of such talk, the different issues 
attended to and how this talk is situated by the social and 
historical context in which it takes place, the adoption of 
this approach accommodates the variability and fluidity of 
clinical psychologists’ accounts neglected by previous 
research. 
Discursive psychology has been used in previous stud-
ies to explore how professional accounts of psychiatric 
medication can be employed to serve rhetorical and per-
suasive functions in managing questions about its efficacy 
(Harper, 1999), to examine the ways in which psychiatric 
diagnoses are produced in professional discourse 
(Wooffitt & Allistone, 2005), and to study how the 
professional use of psychological terms can be the site of 
discursive struggle (McHoul & Rapley, 2005). As such, 
discursive psychology was considered to provide a 
framework well suited to the aim of this study: to explore 
clinical psychologists’ constructions of mental health and 
its perceived impact on their work with service users. 
Methods 
Data for this study comprised audio recordings from 11 
interviews with clinical psychologists in the East 
Midlands region of the United Kingdom. 
Participants 
Prior to carrying out this study we received ethical 
approval from the Institute of Work, Health and 
Organisations at the University of Nottingham. We used a 
purposive maximum-variation sampling strategy because 
it was hoped that recruiting participants from various ser-
vices would allow the range of positions and discourses 
available to speakers to be identified. Clinical psycholo-
gists known to us were sent information about the research 
through email. Eleven clinical psychologists volunteered 
to take part in the study, a sample size consistent with 
other published discursive studies designed to explore 
issues related to professionals’ accounts of mental health 
(e.g., Harper, 1995). Potter and Wetherell (1987) noted 
that discursive psychology methods require smaller 
sample sizes compared to quantitative approaches because 
the success of such studies are dependent not on the 
amount of data but on the research question asked and 
depth of the analysis carried out. Indeed, the adoption of 
saturation as a generic quality marker for qualitative 
research has been argued to be inappropriate and, at worst, 
misleading (O’Reilly & Parker, 2013). 
Because of the small number of participants, demo-
graphic information is offered across the sample to protect 
confidentiality and minimize the risk of identification. The 
sample consisted of 7 women and 4 men, 6 of whom  
had 0 to 10 years of clinical experience, 2 who had 
between 11 and 20 years, and 3 who had between 21 and 
30 years of experience. In terms of age, 5 were between 
31 and 40 years, 3 were between 41 and 50 years, and 3 
were between 51 and 60 years of age. The participants 
worked in a variety of services, including primary and 
secondary care, forensic, community, neuropsychology, 
residential, and child mental health services. 
Interviews 
The use of semistructured interviews in discursive 
research is a contentious issue, and “naturally occurring 
talk” is frequently preferred (Potter & Hepburn, 2005); 
however, interviews enable researchers to purposely 
question a sample on the same issues, and were there-
fore considered to provide an appropriate framework for 
gathering data. Before conducting the interviews, we 
obtained informed consent that included permission to 
audio-record the interviews and to publish anonymized 
extracts. The interviews were aimed at eliciting a range 
of talk around mental health and were guided by an 
interview schedule covering participants’ views of men-
tal health and its effects on their work with service 
users. The development of the interview schedule was 
informed by a literature review and pilot study. Each 
clinical psychologist participated in one interview, the 
duration of which ranged from approximately 40 to 110 
minutes, with an average session duration of about 72 
minutes. 
Transcription and Analysis 
The interviews were recorded using a digital voice 
recorder and transcribed using a simplified form of 
Jeffersonian transcription notation (Rapley, 2007). 
Following Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) suggestions, the 
analysis consisted of an iterative process whereby the 
transcripts were read a number of times while paying 
attention to patterns of language use in the data. 
Anonymized transcripts were discussed in detail in a 
series of data sessions and extracts relating to the differ-
ent categories were then transferred into data files, which 
became the material for analysis. In particular, the differ-
ent systematic ways in which mental health was talked 
about, the various discursive strategies used by speakers 
to construct their accounts as factual and cohesive, and 
the range of positions made available through the talk 
were considered. 
Quality Issues 
As noted, in this study we adopted a social constructionist 
epistemology, thus rejecting the notion of absolute truth 
that logical positivist research is measured against. This 
epistemological difference has considerable implications 
for evaluating the quality of the study because the reading 
of the data is viewed as only one out of a number of pos-
sible interpretations. In line with the suggestion that the 
quality of qualitative research should be evaluated by the 
logic of justification associated with the study’s episte-
mology, we aimed to meet the quality criteria set out by 
Madill, Jordan, and Shirley (2000) for discursive psycho-
logical research. We urge the reader to keep the criteria of 
internal coherence, deviant case analysis, trustworthiness, 
and openness to reader evaluation in mind as they 
consider and evaluate the study. We have included an out-
line of the measures taken to meet these in Supplemental 
Appendix SA (available online at qhr.sagepub.com/ 
supplemental). 
Analysis and Discussion 
The analysis was focused on two features of clinical psy-
chologists’ talk about mental health and the interests 
served by these constructions: first, the ways in which 
speakers constructed mental health as psychosocial vs. 
biological, and second, negotiating difference between 
their views and those of their clients. Both of these 
aspects were salient and permeated the participants’ talk, 
and contained a wide range of the rhetorical strategies 
identified across the data corpus, suggesting that they 
were culturally available to the speakers. To aid reader 
evaluation, extracts from the interviews are used 
throughout the analysis to illustrate the presented 
arguments. The codes next to each extract refer to the 
interviewer (I) and the clinical psychologists who 
participated in the study (CP1, CP2, and so forth). 
Mental Health as Psychosocial vs. Biological 
Edwards and Potter (1992) noted that people frequently 
view others’ accounts as invested to some extent, and 
that there is therefore a risk that an account is discred-
ited on this basis. To manage such dilemmas of stake or 
interest, people deploy discursive strategies to demon-
strate that their accounts are justified or warranted by 
facts rather than being biased or prejudiced. In the fol-
lowing two extracts, accounts of mental health are con-
structed through building up biological factors and 
psychosocial aspects as opposite ends of the spectrum, 
and speakers position themselves as distant from both of 
these extremes. This is achieved through the use of a 
number of discursive strategies that help clinical psy-
chologists manage issues of stake, interest, and 
accountability. 
Extract 1 
 1 Interviewer (I): yes:: yes erm it’s 
 2 a good opportunity to ask you what 
 3 your understanding of mental health 
 4 is? 
 5 Clinical Psychologist 2 (CP2): erm 
 6 yes I mean it’s funny because in 
 7 the process of doing this I was 
 8 kind of thinking what is my neat 
 9 succinct answer to that question 
10 and I don’t ha:::ha I can’t think 
11 of one at all. 
12 I: ha ha. 
13 CP2: erm I would have said 
14 that=well not historically but 
15 maybe for me there is I would 
16 really li::ke it would really 
17 satisfy me to be able to dismiss 
18 the notion of any kind of illness 
19 kind of conceptualization 
20 I: mmmm mmmm. 
21 CP2: of and I am thinking about 
22 psychosis in this case erm it would 
23 really please me to be able to 
24 conclusively dismiss the fact that 
25 it’s an illness and I think my 
26 approach is often informed by that 
27 drive 
28 I: yes. 
29 CP2: to kind of consider 
30 alternatives and think about okay 
31 well let’s think about this 
32 person’s kind of psychological 
33 resources=how they have been 
34 nurtured=their developmental 
35 experiences=their attachment 
36 style=what life has dealt them 
37 because sometimes you know people 
38 just get dealt a crappy hand 
39 I: sure 
40 CP2: and erm so thinking about 
41 how they respond to kind of 
42 psychological burden erm but it’s 
43 the caveat to that is that it’s 
44 then tricky when someone sits in 
45 front of you and says but it is an 
46 illness to me it is 
47 I: mmmm 
48 CP2: and I was well before 
49 my medication has helped 
50 I: yes 
51 CP2: and actually in a way I am 
52 internally cursing them damn it 
53 ha:ha:ha: I really wish I really 
54 had you know, because I suppose 
55 theoretically it’s satisfying to be 
56 able to conceptualize it purely in 
57 terms of psychosocial? stuff but I 
58 am not sure that we can and I think 
59 maybe that’s kind of a naïve erm 
60 its just its that antipsychiatry 
61 thing of just not wanting them to 
62 be right 
63 I: yes 
64 CP2: erm I think ninety percent 
65 they are not but there are times 
66 particularly postqualification 
67 when I have had you kno:w when you 
68 think actually you do:: have to 
69 consider factors like that 
Notably, when asked about mental health, the speaker 
responds by constructing the dismissal of illness concep-
tualizations as an ideal to aspire to. This ideal is then 
explored by listing the “psychosocial stuff” which is pre-
sented as comprising the alternative to an illness concep-
tualization of mental health and is finally dismissed 
through the introduction of a case example on lines (LL) 
44–45, which is used as a contrast to the psychosocial 
aspects of mental health. The use of such contrasts and 
lists has been noted to be powerful in producing factuality 
because it combines ideas eclectically from a range of 
theoretical viewpoints (Edwards & Potter, 1992). 
Similarly, the speaker communicates that she has no stake 
in what she is saying through constructing her stake as 
counter to the illness conceptualization represented by the 
case example, a discursive strategy known as stake 
inoculation. Thereby she positions herself as objective 
and constructs her account as factual (Potter & Hepburn, 
2008). 
The speaker explains that it “would be theoretically 
satisfying” to conceptualize mental health purely in psy-
chosocial terms but that, through experience, she has 
come to think of this as “naïve” and just “that antipsy-
chiatry thing of just not wanting them to be right.” In this 
way, thinking of mental health in purely psychosocial  
terms is presented as a “naïve ideal” which the speaker 
distances herself from using case examples, creating a 
space between theory and practice and referring to the 
authority given by her experience as a clinical 
psychologist. 
Horton-Salway (2001) suggested that rhetorical strate-
gies are used precisely when there is a sensitive or con-
tentious issue. It is therefore interesting that the case 
example is deployed following an account of psychoso-
cial aspects of mental health, an aspect that is presented as 
incongruous with the illness conceptualization which it 
“would really satisfy” the speaker to “conclusively dis-
miss.” Edwards and Potter (1992) noted how such case 
study format examples create the impression of a percep-
tual experience; i.e., as being factual and free from per-
sonal bias. The use of this example constructs the account 
as open to challenge and positions the speaker as reason-
able. Indeed, if someone were to say that the speaker 
endorses an antipsychosocial understanding of mental 
health, one could point to the comment that she views it 
as the ideal conceptualization which, if it weren’t for her 
personal experiences of evidence to the contrary, she 
would embrace. 
In the last part of the extract the speaker makes use of 
various rhetorical strategies to account for the implication 
of biological factors in mental health and thus an illness 
conceptualization. First, the use of the qualifier “I think” 
followed by the numerical approximation “ninety per-
cent” works to position the speaker as thoughtful and 
open to challenge while objectifying the implication of 
biological and psychosocial factors in mental health, thus 
giving them agency in their own right. The use of num-
bers is a common rhetorical device in empiricist accounts 
(Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). Second, through referring to 
“postqualification” the speaker’s talk is constructed as 
coming from a category (qualified clinical psychologist) 
of knowledge, and is thus presented as factual upgrade of 
knowledge. 
It is likely that the interviewer’s position as a trainee 
clinical psychologist prompted the speaker to make use of 
this device, because it might not have carried the same 
epistemic weight in a conversation with another qualified 
or senior clinical psychologist. This rhetorical strategy has 
been named category entitlement by Edwards and Potter 
(1992), who demonstrated how some individuals 
(category members) are expected to possess or have 
access to certain knowledge or skills. Thus, through refer-
ring to such category membership, speakers are able to 
position themselves as “possessing the truth.” 
Finally, on LL 65–69, the speaker describes how not 
just she, but everyone else also needs to take such bio-
logical factors into account. Through characterizing these 
events as having a predictable and sequential pattern, the 
speaker makes use of a discursive strategy referred to by 
Edwards (1995) as script formulation. This helps to man-
age the speaker’s accountability because it “scripts” the 
implication of biological aspects in mental health as an 
aspect that is to be expected or assumed, and therefore 
not the responsibility of the speaker. 
As in the previous excerpt, although asked about 
mental health, the speaker in Extract 2 orients toward a 
conceptualization of mental ill health and constructs 
mental health, mental illness, and mental health problems 
as concepts that are taken to mean the same thing and 
can thus be used interchangeably, as indicated in the 
statement “whatever terminology you use” on LL 82–83. 
Through utilizing the impact of a scientific metaphor 
(“continuum”) along with the powerful nomenclature of 
a scientific and medicalized discourse (“psychosis, mood 
regulation issues”), mental health is then constructed as 
real and as existing regardless of the previously men-
tioned diagnostic categories. 
Extract 2 
70 I: that’s er that’s a good point to 
 71 lead into erm what your 
 72 understanding of mental health is I 
 73 suppose. 
74 CP1: I am very much erm mmm:: my 
 75 starting point I suppose is that I 
76 see most of the issues that people 
 77 struggle with as being part 
 78 of erm er: a continuum of human 
79 experience and obviously people who 
 80 have got a diagnosis of a mental 
81 illness or a mental health problem 
82 however whatever terminology you 
 83 use tend to be people who are just 
 84 at the extreme ends of=of some 
 85 continuum or other which we are all 
 86 on somewhere 
87 I: yes 
88 CP1: erm whether it’s erm 
89 obsessiveness or erm:: you know 
 90 sort of relationship erm you know 
 91 mood regulation type issues or 
 92 whether it’s erm anxiety or even 
 93 psychosis? but I am not a I don’t 
 94 have a sort of radical position on 
 95 erm the sort of the construction 
 96 of=of mental illness in that I 
 97 think it is legitimate for people 
 98 for us to consider and for people 
 99 to consider themselves to have what 
100 might be described as an illness  
101 with a kind of at least partially 
102 physiological basis. I think there 
103 is evidence or a genetic basis you 
104 know there is evidence that=that 
105 those factors are relevant 
106 I: yes 
107 CP1: however? I think that in 
108 general the medical approach to 
109 mental illness is probably erm in a 
110 sense the least important part of 
111 it and of the psychological and 
112 social end of understanding of 
113 somebody’s experience and how their 
114 difficulties have sort of 
115 manifested and understood, erm is 
116 kind of you know seventy-five percent 
117 of the of what’s worth working with 
118 I: yes 
119 CP1: So=yes medication might be 
120 helpful yes it’s important to bear 
121 in mind there might be things that 
122 aren’t going to change through 
123 social or psychological 
124 interventions but I suspect on the 
125 whole in mental health erm that 
126 that’s the sort of the least 
127 important part of it very often for 
128 a lot of people anyway. 
129 I: yes. 
130 CP1: erm so I suppose erm and I 
131 don’t want to put a label on it I 
132 loathe to put a label on it but my 
133 position would be although I am not 
134 a radical antipsychiatry anti- 
135 medical I do:: think that that’s 
136 not where most of the important 
137 stuff goes on I guess I would say 
138 that 
139 I: yes. 
140 CP1: or I would say that because I 
141 am a psychologist 
142 I: yes 
143 CP1: but:but that’s I suppose 
144 where I position myself 
In the second turn, the speaker positions herself as dis-
tant from any radical position before answering the ques-
tion and corrects herself from “I am not a” to “I don’t have 
a sort of radical position.” This rephrasing is noteworthy 
because it changes the intentionality of the statement from 
being one that defines the speaker (the verb to be) into a 
position of choice (the verb to have), thus giving agency to 
the intentional and flexible nature of the stance. This 
statement serves to distance the speaker from 
radical social constructionist views and works as a rhe-
torical disclaimer for the following sentence, in which 
biological aspects of mental health are emphasized. On 
LL 107–111, the speaker also distances herself from the 
“medical approach,” instead emphasizing the importance 
of psychosocial aspects of mental health. The use of 
quantification to describe the extent to which psychoso-
cial factors are implicated in mental health gives the 
account additional epistemic weight. As in the previous 
extract, through constructing her stake as counter to the 
medical approach, stake inoculation is used to protect the 
speaker from accusations that her account is invested or 
biased. 
A recurrent feature of clinical psychologists’ talk was 
that they appeared surprised and confounded by questions 
about their understanding of mental health, as indicated 
by laughter, clarifications, and repetitions of the question. 
This occurred frequently across the interviews, which is 
noteworthy because all participants were told that they 
would be asked about their ideas about mental health 
before agreeing to take part in the study. A possible 
interpretation of these responses is that mental health, as 
indicated in the literature review, is such a vague and 
ambiguous term that it poses difficulties for people 
attempting to explain it. It is also possible that partici-
pants felt nervous or threatened because, in their role as 
mental health professionals, they might be expected to be 
able to answer this question in an authoritative manner. 
Indeed, such features of accounts have been suggested to 
be typical of talk about sensitive and difficult topics (van 
Dijk, 1984). 
As outlined, clinical psychologists produce accounts 
of mental health through presenting psychosocial and 
biological factors as representing opposite extremes and 
then distancing themselves from these poles. A feature of 
this type of account is that speakers note the influence of 
personal ideological commitment in distancing them-
selves from “that antipsychiatry thing of just not wanting 
them not to be right” and the “medical approach,” which 
“is the least important part of it.” One effect of such con-
structions is to present a narrative that asserts the 
implication of biological aspects in mental health 
through distancing oneself from more radical 
understandings which, in turn, are constructed as naïve 
and narrow-minded. 
In Extract 2, the speaker restated her positioning as 
distant from both antipsychiatric and medical understand-
ings of mental health, and then made reference to this 
positioning as being the dominant narrative within clinical 
psychology. Through voicing and acknowledging this 
dominant discourse, the speaker thus introduced her own 
personal agency and subjectivity into the narrative. This 
script formulation functions to construct accounts as ones 
that are to be expected from any clinical psychologist  
while emphasizing personal agency, thus positioning 
speakers as thoughtful, balanced, and reasonable. In the 
following extract the speaker draws on a similar account 
in explaining the factors that have impacted on his views 
of mental health. 
Extract 3 
145 I: what ehmm::: would you say has 
146 influenced your understanding of 
147 mental health? 
148 CP5: erm you know I suppose I am 
149 somebody who tends to think that 
150 most things are partly true just 
151 as almost everything is partly 
152 wrong as well 
153 I: yes 
154 CP5: it’s the kind of models and 
155 ideas that we think of that you 
156 know I find it difficult to 
157 entirely reject any erm but 
158 difficult to entirely embrace any: 
159 I: sure erm yes 
160 CP5: at the expense of others if 
161 you see what=I=mean so I am kind 
162 of a natural erm fence sitter or 
163 fudger or so ha::ha:: erm 
164 I: ha::ha 
165 CP5: but I suppose I defend that 
166 on the basis that I think that’s 
167 how=I think that’s how it really 
168 works 
169 I: yes:: 
170 CP5: you know I think we are a and 
171 the experiences that we have 
172 including the difficult ones=the 
173 dramatic ones that we seek help 
174 for 
175 I: mmmm 
176 CP5: are a combination of you know 
177 what we are you know biologically 
178 evolutionary speaking erm as well 
179 as our more immediate erm 
180 circumstances you know our 
181 psychological and emotional 
182 history our attachment histories 
The speaker asserts that he subscribes to a variety of 
frameworks of mental health. Although this response 
implies that such a multifactorial account simply repre-
sents the way things really work, it can also be viewed as 
a rhetorical strategy and thus be examined for the effect 
that it achieves in talk. On LL 176–182, a range of theo-
retical frameworks of mental health is presented in a 
five-part list, a discursive strategy argued to be effective 
in constructing factual accounts (Edwards & Potter, 
1992). Through eclectically combining ideas from various 
theoretical viewpoints the account is given a degree of 
flexibility, which can be used to manage potential chal-
lenges, a feature described by Harper (1999) in his analy-
sis of psychiatrists’ accounts of the efficacy of 
medication. In this way, if the influence of biological 
factors on mental health were questioned on the basis that 
medical interventions have not had an effect on a person’s 
mental health, then other frameworks can be drawn on as 
an explanation. 
“Fence-sitting” accounts such as these rest on the 
liberal assumption that all points of view have some 
utility and therefore appear to be open to criticisms. 
However, although utilizing rhetoric of eclecticism and 
balance, they have also been argued to assimilate 
criticisms and thereby function to maintain the status 
quo (Billig, 1987). Indeed, one of the effects of fence-
sitting accounts is that they can present a range of 
theories as equally valid but as fixed within a hierarchy. 
For example, Harper (1999) outlined how such accounts 
allowed psychiatrists to construct biology at the “core” 
of mental health problems, and to position psychological 
and social issues as the mere effects of underlying 
biological mechanisms. 
In the following extract the speaker manages the 
dilemma of accounting for the efficacy of medication and 
thus the implication of biological factors after having 
constructed mental health in terms of psychosocial fac-
tors. This is achieved through presenting medication as 
being able to manage people’s mental health on a “very 
surface level.” Such metaphors of depth are a common 
feature of empiricist accounts and function to position 
clinical psychologists as experts with specific knowledge 
about the “realm below the surface.” Because this form of 
knowledge cannot be verified but only assumed through 
paying attention to symptoms or surface signs, it func-
tions as a type of category entitlement. 
Extract 4 
183 CP4: erm and I don’t know you know 
184 maybe that’s true and I suppose 
185 that’s another example of 
186 something that challenges my 
187 reluctance to kind of engage in 
188 biological models of illness 
189 I: mmmmm:: 
190 CP4: and kind of chemical 
191 imbalances and all those kinds of 
192 things because I meet people where 
193 medication really works for them 
194 I: yes 
195 CP4: and makes the difference and 
196 therefore I can’t say there is 
197 nothing in it erm but I also think 
198 that you have to be really 
199 cautious around that so you know 
200 of course somebody appears better 
201 if they are sedated 
202 I: yes 
203 CP4: I erm yes I remember a 
204 service user saying to me once 
205 that you know of course you know 
206 of course he was more tranquil 
207 because he was having massive 
208 amounts of tranquillizer but it 
209 didn’t mean that things had 
210 changed for him necessarily 
211 I: no 
212 CP4: it just meant that they were 
213 managed on a very surface level 
214 and as yet, I suppose alongside 
215 those people who I see take 
216 medication it seems to be really 
217 really helpful for them 
218 I: yes 
219 CP4: I also see a lot of people on 
220 a lot of medication who have been 
221 taking it for a long time and 
222 nothing has changed for them 
223 I: yes 
224 CP4: and you know=so I always have 
225 that I suppose it’s not really a 
226 dilemma but I always have that 
227 kind of mixed view of maybe there 
228 is something in the biology. but 
229 maybe there isn’t 
Through constructing a multifactorial account of men-
tal health, the speaker is able to account for the varying 
efficacy of medication and thus the implication of bio-
logical factors while the primacy of psychosocial factors 
remains unthreatened. Clearly, if the speaker would have 
constructed mental health in purely psychosocial terms she 
might have struggled to offer a solution to such challenges. 
In this way, such multifactorial accounts are able to 
neutralize challenges to a psychosocial account through 
the use of biological theories. Moreover, because the 
account is not tied to any particular theoretical model, it 
can be changed depending on the circumstances, thus fur-
ther increasing its flexibility. 
In the above extracts, mental health was constructed in 
biopsychosocial terms, allowing clinical psychologists to 
implicate biological factors while maintaining the pri-
macy of psychosocial factors in mental health. These 
accounts draw on elements of eclecticism and balance to 
appear flexible and to position clinical psychologists as 
being open-minded, liberal, and thoughtful professionals 
who weigh up arguments for and against in a balanced 
and rational manner. However, as outlined, such accounts 
might also paradoxically work to relativize challenges 
and criticisms and thereby function to maintain current 
practice. 
These criticisms of the discursive effects of fence-sit-
ting accounts are also echoed in the literature concerned 
with the implications of adopting a biopsychosocial 
model of mental health (Stainton-Rogers, 1991; Yardley, 
1996). Engel (1977), the “father” of the biopsychosocial 
model of mental health, suggested that a “rational scien-
tific approach to behavioral and psychosocial data” (p. 
132) should be adopted to create standardized psychoso-
cial measures comparable to biological variables. From 
this point of view, concepts such as cognitions and per-
sonality are to be seen as objective and value-free entities 
representational of an underlying psychological reality. 
In this manner, the biopsychosocial model is able to 
incorporate and assimilate psychosocial aspects of men-
tal health while retaining an essentially biological 
perspective. 
Rather than analyzing psychosocial aspects of mental 
health in biomedical terms, critics of the biopsychosocial 
model have proposed that the biological realm should be 
reinterpreted from a psychosocial viewpoint. From this 
perspective, mental health and biopsychosocial concepts 
are viewed as changeable notions that are constructed 
and maintained by social relationships, roles, and 
practices; for example, through the practices of clinical 
psychologists who advocate selective ideas about what 
mental health really is by outlining the “underlying” 
causes of the conditions that service users present with in 
clinical practice. 
As noted, discursive psychology holds that constructing 
mental health as a biopsychosocial phenomenon is doing 
something beyond the words used; it is performing an 
activity, and detailed reading of the data allows for various 
interpretations of the possible function of such 
constructions to be made (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The 
reading of the clinical psychologists’ construal of mental 
health in biopsychosocial terms was that it legitimated the 
implication of biological factors while emphasizing the 
primacy of psychosocial factors, which was helpful in 
managing dilemmas around the efficacy of medication and 
cases in which there was a lack of psychosocial evidence 
to explain a person’s mental health. 
Negotiating Constructions: A Moral Discourse 
In this study we were also concerned with how clinical 
psychologists construct the influence of their views of 
mental health on their work with service users. As reflected 
in the following extracts, one prevalent feature of these 
accounts was clinical psychologists negotiating the impli-
cations of having different views of mental health from 
their service users through drawing on a discourse of 
moral concern. 
Extract 5 
230 CP9: and just it doesn’t matter? 
231 what I believe you know what 
232 matters is the person’s own view 
233 and their experience and I might 
234 be able to share some helpful 
235 ideas 
236 I: yes 
237 CP9: about that and they may take 
238 them on board and you know they 
239 might kind of buy into some of my 
240 theories around mental health erm 
241 or why they might be facing 
242 difficulties but they might reject 
243 that and I suppose part of the way 
244 that I integrate it into my work 
245 is by always making it clear that 
246 I have a kind of bit of a theory 
247 or a hypothesis and I make it very 
248 tentative 
249 I: mmmm:: 
250 CP9: and I make it very gentle and 
251 I also invite people to reject it 
252 I: yes 
253 CP9: as much as I invite people to 
254 buy into it so you know quite 
255 often in sessions it’s not unusual 
256 for me to say you know I have got 
257 an idea or it might be wrong and 
258 tell me if I am completely off the 
259 mark or you know 
260 I: yes 
261 CP9: I think I am very=I am very 
262 keen for the client to know that 
263 they are the expert on them 
Through the continuous use of the modal auxiliaries 
“might” and “may,” the tentativeness of the speaker’s 
subjective account is emphasized. These features give an 
impression of collaboration and function to position the 
speaker as a liberal and nondirective clinician whose pri-
mary concern is to empower service users. In line with 
this, previous researchers have noted the need for clini-
cians to come across as being open-minded and to take on 
the attitude of “independent objective discussants” 
(Fowler, Garety & Kuipers, 1995). 
Another feature of this discourse is to present oneself 
as a responsible professional through providing examples 
of authoritarian clinical psychologists and then 
304 know I don’t want to be someone 
305 that kind of imposes a view so I 
306 think if you take a position where 
307 you say let’s think about what may 
308 have led to your current 
309 difficulties erm then you know 
310 then you can coconstruct 
311 something that’s meaningful to the 
312 client? 
Extract 6 
264 CP9: I suppose I manage it by and 
265 I always manage it by taking a 
266 kind of not knowing position and 
267 taking a position of not having 
268 any certainty 
269 I: mmmm:: 
270 CP9: So I would never impose on 
271 somebody that their view=you know 
272 their view is wrong or just 
273 because it’s different to mine I 
274 don’t see myself as an expert who 
275 knows more about their experience 
276 than they do 
277 I: right 
278 CP9: erm and I think that’s really 
279 dangerous and in fact I was having 
280 a conversation with a service user 
281 not a client but someone who has 
282 used psychology services in the 
283 past recently and they were saying 
284 that they had a really awful 
285 experience of going to a 
286 psychologist who was very 
287 insistent on what the formulation 
288 was 
289 I: yes 
290 CP9: of the problem and that 
291 things that she had seen in her 
292 life as good the psychologist 
293 turned that so you know the 
294 formulation kind of made out that 
295 things had caused her problems 
296 that she actually didn’t believe 
297 had caused her problems 
298 I: mmmm 
299 CP9: and had never thought about 
300 it in a kind of negative way 
301 I: yes 
302 CP9: and you know I never want to 
303 be that psychologist basically you 
distancing oneself from these. Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
noted that speakers do not only use discursive strategies to 
present particular versions of events in constructing their 
accounts, but also deploy rhetorical devices to undermine 
alternative versions that might pose a threat to how that 
person wants to be understood. Examples of such accounts 
can be seen in the following two excerpts, in which 
speakers address the threat to themselves as 
noncollaborative clinicians through the deployment of case 
examples, thus enabling their talk to be viewed from a 
moral framework where accountability can be managed 
and allocated within interactions. In this extract, the service user’s expertise is given agency  
through the assumption of a “not knowing” position. This 
account is then corroborated through the use of a case exam-
ple which is strengthened through vivid and detailed descrip-
tions and by the authority of personal experience, which 
positions the speaker as a credible witness (Edwards & Potter, 
1992). The deployment of the extreme case formulations “really 
dangerous” and “really awful” functions to further emphasize the 
seriousness of the example (Pomerantz, 1986). The speaker 
strongly distances herself from those clinical psychologists who 
“impose” their views on others and places evaluative moral force in 
the word “impose,” which constructs the behavior of such 
clinicians as morally unjustifiable and unethical. This distancing is 
also achieved through the use of the personal pronoun “you” and 
“you know,” which works to co-opt the interviewer. 
The deployment of the word “coconstruct” suggests a social 
constructionist discourse in which views about mental health 
might change depending on their situated-ness. Indeed, the 
reluctance to make use of the word “truth” and the use of words 
such as “ideas” and “views,” which do not imply a singular, 
fixed, or neutral way of looking at things, were a prevalent 
feature of clinical psychologists’ talk about the effects of their 
views about mental health. Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) noted that 
although the activity performed by participants’ constructions 
cannot be known by analysts, theories about the functions of 
such accounts can nevertheless be developed through familiarity 
with the data. It seems that through presenting views about 
mental health within a social constructionist ontology, clinical 
psychologists are able to resolve the potential dilemma of having 
conflicting views and instead emphasize their primary concern: 
their ability to be helpful to service users through coconstructing 
narratives. 
Extract 7 
 
313CP2: and also when someone tells 313 
314you that that’s how they view 314 
315who are we? to tell them that 315 
316are wrong? 316 
I: yes 317 
 318 
CP2: otherwise I am just pushing
319 my agenda on them aren’t I? 
320 I: yes 
321 CP2: by saying no=no it’s all 
322 about stress=it’s all about your 
323 psychological resources actually 
324 they don’t want to hear that and 
325 it’s not necessarily useful 
326 I: yes 
327 CP2: if they want to think of it 
328 as an illness then. and do you 
329 know what really annoys me about 
330 psychologists? actually who 
331 are=who do that and I am only 
332 thinking of a couple I am not 
333 saying this is a widespread 
334 occurrence but I do know a couple 
335 of psychologists who=who will push 
336 the psychosocial agenda on 
337 someone who views their experience 
338 as an illness because that’s their 
339 agenda 
340 I: mmmm::: 
341 CP2: because they think that there 
342 is some inherent value in someone 
343 understanding it that way rather 
344 than that way and I always think 
345 that actually boils down to 
346 arrogance really 
347 I: mmmmm::: 
348 CP2: of thinking well no my idea 
349 is better than yours. 
350 I: yes yes 
351 CP2: and it’s not for us to 
352 dictate is it you know if someone 
353 think of themselves as ill and 
354 that=that’s not fundamentally 
355 undermining their recovery then 
356 why would we suggest that they are 
357 wrong? 
As in the previous extract, the speaker uses a case 
example to position clinicians who “push their own agen-
das” as irresponsible and arrogant. This strong moral dis-
course is highlighted both in the first and the last sentence, 
in which rhetorical questions are asked as if to invoke 
common sense: Why fix something that is not broken? The 
use of consensus is a common discursive strategy to 
enhance facticity and functions to position the speaker as 
balanced and reasonable (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
As we have seen, clinicians root their discourse and 
justify their decision not to challenge service users’ views 
about mental health in a discourse of moral concern. This 
concern is perhaps unsurprising given its integral role in 
the therapeutic relationship and that it is widely considered 
to be closely linked to clinicians’ credibility (Gibson,  
2006). Nevertheless, the explicit concern with not impos-
ing views of mental health on service users is interesting, 
because most schools of therapy offer resources for chal-
lenging service users’ lifeworlds. As described by Gergen 
(2009), if a client talks about issues of sexual perversion 
the psychoanalyst moves on to enquire about childhood 
experiences, and if a client speaks about how everyone is 
laughing at him the cognitive therapist asks if they could 
be laughing at something else. These therapeutic 
responses serve to challenge the reality of the service user 
by communicating, “You thought it was this, but it is (or 
could be) that.” Indeed, George Kelly (1969), doubting 
the alleged truths and insights resulting from psychother-
apy, concluded that insights occur only when service 
users adopt the perspective of therapists. 
Disclosing Views: A Moral Dilemma 
As reflected in the following extracts, another prevalent 
feature of clinical psychologists’ accounts was whether 
service users are aware of clinicians’ conceptualizations, 
and whether these ideas should be made explicit. 
Extract 8 
358 I: ermm do you think that your the 
359 service users that you see that 
360 they come away with erm an idea 
361 about your views about mental 
362 health? 
363 CP6: I would hope so yes yes:: I 
364 think I would hope that they would 
365 come away with an understanding of 
366 how I view it I would also hope 
367 they’d come away with an 
368 understanding that I am equally 
369 open and interested to know about 
370 their understanding of it and that 
371 even if the two positions are 
372 different then that doesn’t mean 
373 that that’s a problem 
374 I: mmmmm:: 
375 CP6: and that that’s okay 
376 I: yes 
377 CP6: erm so I think it’s equally 
378 I would want them to come away 
379 with a clear understanding of how 
380 I view things so that they can 
381 disagree or not and likewise I 
382 would want them to go away with a 
383 very clear view that I am keen to 
384 know what their understanding is 
385 I: yes=yes 
386 CP6: of it and whether our views 
387 match or whether they don’t 
388 I: mmmm 
389 CP6: and if that’s a problem for 
390 working together or if it’s not 
391 but I I am a believer in being 
392 very explicit about these things 
In this excerpt the speaker presents the issue of service 
users coming away with an idea of her construction of 
mental health as something desired, an ideal to be aspired 
to, while highlighting her interest in the service user’s 
understanding. This view is justified through giving agency 
to the expertise of service users, because if they are aware 
of their clinicians’ views they are also able to disagree with 
them. The speaker emphasizes that although conversing 
views of mental health could present problems, it would 
not necessarily do so. In the following excerpt, the speaker 
draws on a similar discourse of moral concern for service 
users in accounting for his decision to disclose his position. 
This is evident in the numerous benefits to service users 
that the speaker argues that such disclosures lead to, and 
the way in which he distances himself from “imposing” his 
views. 
Extract 9 
393 CP11: errm so that informs that so 
394 I guess I try and=and I suppose 
395 that partly informs why I give 
396 people information about my views 
397 on mental health I don’t I like to 
398 think I impose them but I think 
399 that kind of if you can give it to 
400 people in an accessible way then 
401 they are able to make choices so 
402 actually you know I think they can 
403 put them that erm elevates their 
404 knowledge and when people have 
405 knowledge they can make better 
406 choices I think for themselves 
407 I: yes 
408 CP11: so I suppose that’s partly 
409 thinking back to your earlier 
410 question about why do I how do 
411 people I see end up knowing what I 
412 think erm: I do think that does 
413 influence my practice that I am 
414 trying if you like lay bare the 
415 assumptions behind what people do 
416 erm just so that then clients can 
417 make better choices about the 
418 kinds of help they want and have a 
419 bit more agency in their care 
The implication of this account is that clinicians who do 
not disclose their ideas deprive service users from having 
these choices. These constructions therefore give agency 
to service users’ expertise and their right to make their 
own decisions regarding their care through emphasizing 
the importance of being transparent as a clinician. 
Moreover, as noted in the above extract, they also warrant 
the challenging of clinicians’ accounts, thereby construct-
ing service users as active agents. In this way, the disclo-
sure of clinical psychologists’ views of mental health to 
service users is presented as a moral necessity, an action 
performed out of respect for service users’ autonomy. 
By presenting the need to disclose views in a manner 
that positions them as responsible clinicians, clinical psy-
chologists are thus able to manage the dilemma of self-
presentation or impression management (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). Notably, through constructing the issue 
of whether to disclose one’s views of mental health to 
service users in moral terms, the decision is converted 
from a neutral idea into a value-laden judgment call. 
This, in turn, was evident in the many explanations and 
justifications that the speakers offered for their decisions, 
as reflected in the following excerpt. 
Extract 10 
420 CP7: and I would have to explain 
421 myself to a client to some extent 
422 and I think that probably marks me 
423 I’d be surprised if many clinical 
424 psychologists erm are that clear 
425 about it you know I mean=I think 
426 there is an analogy to me you know 
427 when a CBT
1
 therapist socializes 
428 someone in to the model I don’t 
429 really see there is anything 
430 different in what they are doing 
431 from what I am doing it’s just 
432 that we have different beliefs I 
433 mean somebody who fully signs up 
434 to CBT that is a satisfactory 
435 model of a person and of course 
436 they have a good ethical base in 
437 doing it because it’s grounded in 
438 quite a lot of empirical support 
439 so they can easily defend 
440 themselves and say well what I am 
441 doing is telling people what’s 
442 scientifically true about persons 
443 erm: 
444 I: yes:: 
445 CP7: erm so all I am=ermm=so 
446 that technically I’m giving them 
447 information erm and I guess my 
448 views on people are you know not 
449 the same as that but I guess you 
450 know=you always give some 
451 information about your views as 
452 part of the practice I think it’s 
453 unavoidable 
The speaker first positions himself as different from 
other clinical psychologists and then likens his decision to 
disclose his views about mental health to cognitive-
behavioral therapists socializing service users to the 
model. This analogy could be seen as working to equate 
the speaker’s actions with those prescribed by the socially 
sanctioned, evidence-based framework of CBT, thus pre-
senting it as more acceptable and as something that “any-
one would do.” This account, then, functions to legitimize 
the speaker’s initial positioning as different from the 
norm. On LL 445–446, the speaker corrects himself from 
“so all I am” to “so that technically.” These starts are 
noteworthy because they minimize the speaker’s decision 
to disclose his views and highlight the need for justifica-
tion. Finally, the speaker introduces the idea that views 
are always shared, whether we like it or not. This con-
struction can be viewed as allowing the speaker to man-
age issues of accountability because, if someone were to 
question his rationale for disclosing his views on the basis 
of it being similar to socializing service users to a CBT 
model, he could refer to his response that it is unavoid-
able to transmit some ideas. 
As noted throughout this analysis, clinical psycholo-
gists negotiate the influence of their views of mental 
health on their work with service users through drawing 
on a discourse of moral concern. This discourse was 
recurrent in the arguments and explanations that the 
speakers constructed in responding to our questions, and 
it allowed their talk to be viewed from a moral 
framework where accountability could be managed 
within interactions. These were presented within a social 
constructionist ontology that functioned to highlight 
how, despite having different views about mental health, 
the clinical psychologists were nevertheless able to work 
with service users to coconstruct narratives. As well as 
being professional, such accounts might also function to 
reflect aspects of clinicians’ ethical self, their need to 
know that they are benefitting service users rather than 
causing them harm. 
Discussion 
In this article we have presented a reading of clinical psy-
chologists’ accounts of mental health in which participants 
constructed biological factors and psychosocial aspects as 
opposite ends of a spectrum. By positioning themselves as 
distant from these extremes, participants 
were able to manage issues of stake and accountability 
and to present their accounts as credible. This construc-
tion legitimated the implication of biological factors 
while emphasizing the primacy of psychosocial factors, 
which was helpful in managing cases in which there was 
a lack of psychosocial evidence to explain a person’s 
mental health. Consistent with Potter and Wetherell’s 
(1987) observations, participants used a range of 
different rhetorical strategies to construct their accounts 
of mental health. In particular, stake inoculation, 
category entitlement, and case examples were used to 
present their constructions as factual and to manage 
issues of accountability. 
The discursive strategies deployed by the clinical psy-
chologists in this study are consistent with past discur-
sively informed studies, showing a cross-topic relevance 
by demonstrating how clinicians rely on particular rhe-
torical devices to “get things done” in verbal interactions 
(Georgaca, 2014). For example, researchers has outlined 
how clinicians use such discursive strategies to construct 
their accounts as credible (Harper, 1995; 1999), to meet 
challenges to their constructions (Harper, 1994), and to 
manage issues of professional accountability in clinical 
interactions (Robertson, Paterson, Lauder, Fenton, & 
Gavin, 2010). 
In this study we were also concerned with how 
clinical psychologists constructed the influence of their 
views of mental health on their work with service users. 
One prevalent feature of these accounts was participants 
negotiating the implications of having different views of 
mental health than their service users through drawing on 
a discourse of moral concern, which functioned to 
manage issues of accountability. The issue of how to 
manage power and collaboration is a common dilemma 
in psychotherapy (Frank, 1973) and, in line with this data 
corpus, previous discursive studies have demonstrated 
how clinicians manage the implications of challenging 
service users’ beliefs through drawing on a discourse of 
collaboration (Messari & Hallam, 2003). 
Another issue that was brought up by a number of par-
ticipants was the ethical need to disclose views about 
mental health to service users so as to enable them to 
make informed choices in their interactions with services. 
This narrative is echoed by both the recovery movement 
(Andresen, Oades, & Caputi, 2011) and the Department of 
Health (2010), which have argued such transparency to be 
key to the empowerment of service users’ and clinicians’ 
professional accountability, respectively. 
In this article we have shown various assumptions 
implicit in professionals’ accounts and examined the con-
sequences of these accounts, in particular for how clini-
cians and service users are positioned. As outlined in the 
literature review, clinicians’ views and assumptions about 
mental health have been found to guide and inform their 
approaches to assessment, formulation, and intervention 
(Harland et al., 2009) and to shape service users’ views 
about their conditions (Ahn et al., 2009). This implies 
that there is a need for clinicians to be honest about the 
contingent and situated nature of their knowledge and 
language, to make their assumptions about mental health 
explicit, and to be mindful of the effects of their use of 
language on different stakeholders in talking about men-
tal health. 
Clearly, if clinicians are not open about such issues 
there might be a risk of service users passively complying 
with a process that they do not understand or feel they 
benefit from, thereby ethically compromising clinicians’ 
practice. Moreover, such open and honest conversations 
are likely to strengthen the therapeutic alliance, a factor 
associated with positive outcomes (Martin, Garske, & 
Davis, 2000) and service user satisfaction (Roberts & 
Holmes, 1998) across therapies. 
On a theoretical level, the findings demonstrate that 
there is a range of constructions of mental health avail-
able to clinical psychologists, and the analysis high-
lighted the variability and ambiguity of the participants’ 
accounts. This highlights the various difficulties that 
individuals face in negotiating the concept of mental 
health and that, rather than relying on the a priori 
assumption that mental health is a consensual object of 
thought, future studies should be designed to capture this 
complexity. Finally, on a methodological level, to our 
knowledge this research represents the first discursive 
psychological examination of clinical psychologists’ 
constructions of mental health and its effects on their 
work with service users. As such, not only does it fill a 
gap in the discursive analytic literature by examining the 
topic of mental health as an action-oriented discursive 
practice but it also offers a discursive space to examine 
the interactive actions performed in other controversial 
and contested issues. 
The use of this novel approach is not without its limi-
tations. In particular, the use of “artificial data” has been 
argued to decrease the ecological validity of findings 
(Potter & Hepburn, 2005). Although not epistemologi-
cally problematic, the method of data collection is likely 
to have impacted on the variability of the data. Given 
that mental health is an ambiguous and contested term, 
participants might have been conscious of how they 
would be perceived in constructing their accounts. 
The presence of the interviewer is likely to have influ-
enced the ways in which the clinical psychologists “did” 
professional accountability and how they defended their 
constructions of mental health and the choices made in 
clinical practice. As such, the views and constructions of 
the participants could be argued to be intersubjective, tak-
ing into account what they perceived to be the interview-
er’s views of mental health. Future studies might therefore 
consider how clinical psychologists present and negotiate  
constructions of mental health with service users and 
other professionals in clinical settings, thus providing 
the opportunity to compare the data from this study with 
naturally occurring talk. 
Although the influence of cultural context was high-
lighted in analyzing the actions performed by clinical 
psychologists’ talk, it did not focus on wider contextual 
issues as much as a different form of discourse analysis 
might. For instance, undertaking this study using 
Foucauldian discourse analysis would enable a more 
thorough consideration of the impact of historical and 
cultural context on clinical psychologists’ discourse. 
Such an approach might help to identify and document 
the disciplinary discourses used by clinical psycholo-
gists to construct mental health and its effects, which 
would be helpful because it might lead to a rethinking of 
clinical psychologists’ conceptual underpinnings in rela-
tion to mental health. In this study we focused specifi-
cally on clinical psychologists’ constructions of mental 
health and its perceived effects. One question that has 
been left unanswered is how service users construct 
mental health and their experiences of how views of 
mental health are negotiated in their interactions with 
clinicians, which would be an interesting extension to 
this research. 
Acknowledgments 
We gratefully acknowledge the support of Saima Masud 
in assisting with the research process. 
Declaration of Conflicting Interests 
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with 
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this 
article. 
Funding 
The authors received no financial support for the research, 
authorship, and/or publication of this article. 
Note 
1. Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) is a psychotherapeutic 
approach aimed at reducing psychological distress through 
changing the way people think and behave. 
References 
Ahn, W., Flanagan, E., Marsh, J., & Sanislow, C. (2006). 
Beliefs about essences and the reality of mental disorders. 
Psychological Science, 17, 759–766. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2006.01779.x 
Ahn, W., Proctor, C. C., & Flanagan, E. H. (2009). Mental 
health clinicians’ beliefs about the biological, psycho-
logical, and environmental bases of mental disorders. 
Cognitive Science, 33, 147–182. doi:10.1111/j.1551-
6709.2009.01008.x 
Downloaded from qhr.sagepub.com at University of Nottingham on September 9, 2014 
Andresen, R., Oades, L. G., & Caputi, P. (2011). Psychological 
recovery: Beyond mental illness. Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Bennett, L., Thirlaway, K., & Murray, A. J. (2008). The 
stigmatising implications of presenting schizophrenia as a 
genetic disease. Journal of Genetic Counseling, 17, 550–
559. doi:10.1007/s10897-008-9178-8 
Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and thinking. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Billig, M. (1999). Freudian repression: Conversation creating 
the unconscious. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Campbell, R. J. (2010). Mental health. In Campbell’s psychiat- 
ric dictionary. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cape, G., Antebi, D., Standen, P., & Glazebrook, C. (1994). 
Schizophrenia: The views of a sample of psychiatrists. 
Journal of Mental Health, 3, 105–113. 
doi:10.3109/09638239409003784 
Crossley, M. L. (2002). “Could you please pass one of those 
health leaflets along?” Exploring health, morality and resis-
tance through focus groups. Social Science & Medicine, 55, 
1471–1483. doi:10.1016/S0277-9536(01)00265-9 
Department of Health. (2010). Equity and excellence: 
Liberating the NHS. London: Author. 
Edwards, D. (1995). Two to tango: Script formulations, disposi-
tions, and rhetorical symmetry in relationship troubles talk. 
Research on Language and Social Interaction, 28(4), 319– 
350. Retrieved from http://homepages.lboro.ac.uk/~ssde/ 
Edwards%20%20Two%20to%20tango%201995.pdf 
Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1992). Discursive psychology. 
London: SAGE. 
Engel, G. L. (1977). The need for a new medical model: A chal-
lenge for biomedicine. Science, 196, 129–136. doi:10.1126/ 
science.847460 
Fernando, S. (2003). Cultural diversity, mental health and psy-
chiatry. London: Routledge. 
Fowler, D., Garety, P., & Kuipers, E. (1995). Cognitive 
behaviour therapy for psychosis: Theory and practice. 
Chichester, United Kingdom: Wiley. 
Frank, J. D. (1973). Persuasion & healing: A comparative 
study of psychotherapy. London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Georgaca, E. (2014). Discourse analytic research on mental dis-
tress: A critical overview. Journal of Mental Health, 
23(2), 55-61. doi:10.3109/09638237.2012.734648 
Gergen, K. J. (2009). Relational being: Beyond self and com-
munity. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gibson, S. (2006). Respect as esteem: The case of counselling. 
Res Publica, 12(1), 77–95. doi:10.1007/s11158-006-0007-3 
Gilbert, G. N., & Mulkay, M. (1984). Opening Pandora’s box: 
A sociological analysis of scientists’ discourse. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Harland, R., Antonova, E., Owen, G. S., Broome, M., Landau, 
S., Deeley, Q., & Murray, R. (2009). A study of psychia-
trists’ concepts of mental illness. Psychological Medicine, 
39, 967–976. doi:10.1017/S0033291708004881 
Harper, D. (1994). The professional construction of “paranoia” 
and the discursive use of diagnostic criteria. British 
Journal of Medical Psychology, 67, 131–143. Retrieved 
from www. ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7918208 
Harper, D. (1995). Discourse analysis and mental health. 
Journal of Mental Health, 4, 347–357. 
doi:10.1080/09638239550037406 
Harper, D. (1999). Tablet talk and depot discourse: Discourse 
analysis and psychiatric medication. In C. Willig (Ed.), 
Applied discourse analysis: Social and psychological 
interventions (pp. 125–144). Buckingham, United 
Kingdom: Open University Press. 
Hayes, R. L., & Oppenheim, R. (1997). Constructivism: Reality 
is what you make it. In T. L. Sexton & B. L. Griffin (Eds.), 
Constructivist thinking in counselling practice, research, 
and thinking (pp. 19-40). New York: Teacher’s College 
Press. 
Horton-Salway, M. (2001). The construction of M.E.: The dis-
cursive action model. In M. Wetherell, S. Taylor, & S. J. 
Yates (Eds.), Discourse as data (pp. 148–188). London: 
SAGE. 
Hugo, M. (2001). Mental health professionals’ attitudes toward 
people who have experienced a mental health disorder. 
Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 8(5), 
419–425. doi:10.1046/j.1351-0126.2001.00430.x 
Kelly, G. A. (1969). Psychotherapy and the nature of man. In 
B. Maher (Ed.), Clinical psychology and personality (pp. 
207–215). London: Wiley. 
Kendell, R. (1995). Mental health and mental illness. In D. 
Trent & C. Reed (Eds.), Promoting mental health (pp. 33– 
40). Avebury, United Kingdom: Aldershot. 
Kent, H., & Read, J. (1998). Measuring consumer participation in 
mental health services: Are attitudes related to professional 
orientation? International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 44, 
295–310. doi:10.1177/002076409804400406 
Madill, A., Jordan, A., & Shirley, C. (2000). Objectivity and 
reliability in qualitative analysis: Realist, contextualist and 
radical constructionist epistemologies. British Journal of 
Psychology, 91, 1–20. 
Malek, M. (2004). Understanding ethnicity and children’s men-
tal health. In M. Malek & C. Joughin (Eds.), Mental health 
services for minority ethnic children and adolescents. 
London: Jessica Kingsley. 
Martin, D., Garske, J., & Davis, K. (2000). Relation of the 
therapeutic alliance with outcome and other variables: A 
meta-analytic review. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 68, 438–450. Retrieved from www.ncbi.nlm. 
nih.gov/pubmed/10883561 
McHoul, A., & Rapley, M. (2005). A case of ADHD diagnosis: 
Sir Karl and Francis B slug it out on the consulting room 
floor. Discourse and Society, 16(3), 419–449. 
doi:10.1177/0957926505051173 
Messari, S., & Hallam, R. (2003). CBT for psychosis: A 
qualitative analysis of client’s experiences. British Journal 
of Clinical Psychology, 42, 171–188. 
doi:10.1348/014466503321903580 
Newton, J. (1988). Preventing mental illness. London: 
Routledge. 
Nightingale, D. J., & Cromby, J. (1999). Social constructionist 
psychology: A critical analysis of theory and practice. 
Buckingham, United Kingdom: Open University Press. 
O’Reilly, M., & Parker, N. (2013). ‘Unsatisfactory saturation’: 
A critical exploration of the notion of saturated sample 
sizes in qualitative research. Qualitative Research, 13(2), 
190–197. doi:10.1177/1468794112446106 
Parker, I. (2012). Discourse analysis: Dimensions of critique in 
psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 10(3), 
223–239. doi:10.1080/14780887.2012.741509 
Pickering, N. J. (2006). The metaphor of mental illness. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pomerantz, A. M. (1986). Extreme case formulations: A new 
way of legitimating claims. Human Studies, 9, 219–230. 
doi:10.1007/BF00148128 
Potter, J., & Hepburn, A. (2005). Qualitative interviews in 
psychology: Problems and possibilities. Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 2, 281–307. doi:10.1191/1478-
088705qp045oa 
Potter, J., & Hepburn, A. (2008). Discursive constructionism. In 
J. A. Holstein & J. F. Gubrium (Eds.), Handbook of con-
structionist research (pp. 275–293). New York: Guildford. 
Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and social psy-
chology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour. London: SAGE. 
Rapley, T. (2007). Doing conversation, discourse and docu-
ment analysis. London: SAGE. 
Roberts, G., & Holmes, J. (1998). Healing stories: Narrative in psy-
chiatry and psychotherapy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Robertson, M., Paterson, B., Lauder, B., Fenton, R., & Gavin, 
J. (2010). Accounting for accountability: A discourse 
analysis of psychiatric nurses’ experience of a patient 
suicide. Open Nursing Journal, 4, 1–8. 
doi:10.2174/1874434601004010001 
Secker, J. (1998). Current conceptualizations of mental health 
and mental health promotion. Health Education Research, 
13(1), 57–66. doi:10.1093/her/13.1.57 
Stainton-Rogers, W. (1991). Explaining health and illness: An 
exploration of diversity. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Stevens, P., & Harper, D. J. (2007). Professional accounts of 
electroconvulsive therapy: A discourse analysis. Social 
Science and Medicine, 64(7), 1475–1486. doi:10.1016/j. 
socscimed.2006.11.015 
VandenBos, G. R. (Ed.). (2007). Mental health. In APA dic-
tionary of psychology. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
van Dijk, T. A. (1984). Prejudice in discourse. Amsterdam: 
Benjamins. 
Vassilev, I., & Pilgrim, D. (2007). ‘Risk’, ‘trust’ and the myth 
of ‘mental health services.’ Journal of Mental Health, 
16(3), 347–357. doi:10.1080/09638230701299178 
Wallach, H. S. (2004). Changes in attitudes towards mental 
illness following exposure. Community Mental Health 
Journal, 40(3), 235–248. doi:10.1023/ 
B:COMH.0000026997.92083.4d 
Wooffitt, R., & Allistone, S. (2005). Towards a discursive 
parapsychology: Language and the laboratory study of 
anomalous communication. Theory and Psychology, 
15(3), 325–355. doi:10.1177/0959354305053218 
Yardley, L. (1996). Material discourses of health and illness. 
London: Routledge. 
Yardley, L. (2000). Dilemmas in qualitative health research. 
Psychology and Health, 15(2), 215-228. 
doi:10.1080/08870440008400302 
Author Biographies 
Axel Lofgren, DClinPsy, is a clinical psychologist in a children 
and adolescent mental health service and is affiliated with the 
University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom. 
Vanessa Hewitt, DClinPsy, is a clinical psychologist and 
research tutor with the Trent Doctorate in Clinical Psychology at 
the University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom. 
Roshan das Nair, PhD, CPsychol, is a consultant clinical psy-
chologist and research tutor with the Trent Doctorate in 
Clinical Psychology at the University of Nottingham, and the 
Department of Clinical Psychology & Neuropsychology at 
Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust, Nottingham, 
United Kingdom. 
